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25 February 1961

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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


4. France-Algeria: Algerian rebels publicly endorse De Gaulle - Bourguiba meeting. (*Page iii*)
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[REDACTED]

France-Algeria: Both De Gaulle and Tunisian President Bourguiba probably believe that their forthcoming meeting on 27 February will lead to direct negotiations between De Gaulle and Premier Ferhat Abbas of the Provisional Algerian Government (PAG). The PAG in Tunis has now publicly endorsed the De Gaulle - Bourguiba meeting and reportedly has authorized Bourguiba to make preliminary soundings on matters of substance. [REDACTED]

Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland: Unless racial violence erupts and inflames settler emotions, Prime Minister Welensky of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland will probably avoid at this time a definitive break with Britain over the issue of sharply increased African influence in Northern Rhodesia's government. Welensky, who is an exponent of continued white control of the Federation, has already mobilized non-African troops, instituted strict control of foreign exchange and summoned the Federation's parliament in an emergency session; meanwhile, police leaves have been canceled in Southern Rhodesia. On 27 February he plans to present in parliament a motion empowering his government "to resist by every means" any attempt by London to take political power in Northern Rhodesia out of the hands of "responsible people." At present, white settlers hold a majority of the elective seats in the legislature but are subject to the control of the British governor. [REDACTED]

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Brazil: President Janio Quadros' policy of closer relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc is arousing controversy within Brazil, particularly among the military. Armed forces officers are reported cold toward renewal of diplomatic relations, although apparently not averse to increased trade. The Foreign Ministry nevertheless announced on 23 February that Brazil will establish relations with Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. Although the Quadros administration has promised to support inclusion of the Chinese representation question on the UN General Assembly agenda at the next session, it has announced that the decision on whether Brazil will support admitting Communist China to the UN will be made later. 25X1

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De Gaulle - Bourguiba Meeting

Before setting a date for the meeting between De Gaulle and Bourguiba both sides took extensive soundings to assure that some tangible gains would result. Tunisian Secretary of State for Information Mohamed Masmoudi, who arranged the meeting, reportedly came away from personal sessions with De Gaulle convinced of his sincerity in desiring to negotiate a settlement. Masmoudi also probed French opinion in private talks with figures outside of the government. French civilian and military working groups in Paris have reportedly subsequently completed plans for cease-fire arrangements and for self-determination. De Gaulle is reported willing to bring imprisoned rebel vice premier Ben Bella to Paris at the time of the Bourguiba visit, and may halt the execution of Moslem terrorists.


In Tunis, the rebel Provisional Algerian Government (PAG) at first appeared distrustful of Bourguiba's intentions, and was irritated that he had announced acceptance of De Gaulle's invitation without consulting them. On 17 February, however, Masmoudi told a US official the PAG had come to full agreement that Bourguiba should meet with De Gaulle in the interests of bringing about direct negotiations.

An officer of the PAG who confirmed this position to the US Embassy in Tunis on 23 February declared that Masmoudi had promised that Bourguiba would not meet with De Gaulle until Paris had demonstrated willingness to make substantive progress toward an Algerian solution. The same day an editorial in El Moujahid, the official organ of the rebel movement, praised Bourguiba for "making incessant efforts to re-establish peace."

The rebel leaders probably would not risk adverse reactions in Morocco and the UAR to such an endorsement without reasonable certainty that Bourguiba's visit will produce results. Bourguiba himself in a 23 February radio address, said that the fact De Gaulle invited him for exploratory talks indicates that "the obstacles which blocked direct peace negotiations in the past have been surmounted."

In Algeria, military operations by both sides have recently been intensified. Rebel losses are increasing, since the French

units withdrawn from the fighting areas to keep order in the cities during the December riots and the January referendum are returning to action. French official sources claim nearly 600 rebels were put out of action during the week of 18 February, as opposed to an average of 380 a week in January. In his farewell order on 13 February, former Commander in Chief in Algeria General Crepin asserted that rebel terrorist acts had dropped to 15 a day instead of the 1960 average of 30 a day. The American consul general in Algiers comments, however, that the average citizen is hardly aware of the difference, and that an undercurrent of fear and violence persists along the fringes of the large cities. Reports continue that European extremists plan "one last mighty effort" of spectacular terrorism to coincide with any announcement that French-PAG negotiations are to begin.



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Brazilian President's Foreign Policy Arouses Opposition
Among Military

Unrest within the military over the Quadros administration's plans to expand diplomatic relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc

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The new administration's changes in assignments of high-ranking military officers are adding to military restlessness but the stability of the regime does not now appear threatened.

Brazil now has missions in Czechoslovakia and Poland. In addition to the planned diplomatic relations with three Soviet satellites, Quadros is apparently considering renewing relations with the USSR and possibly establishing them with Communist China. An East German press service reported on 20 February that Quadros in a telegram to East German party boss Ulbricht had expressed the wish "that relations between our two states may grow closer. . . ." There is no indication that Brazilian - East German relations are now under serious consideration, although Foreign Minister Arinos stated in accepting his cabinet post on 31 January that Brazil intends "to establish diplomatic and commercial relations with all states of the world that desire pacific interchange with us."

Quadros' speed in announcing steps to expand diplomatic relations with the bloc is probably intended primarily to conciliate leftist-nationalist groups, which generally opposed Quadros' election. A widespread Brazilian belief in the country's growing importance in world affairs is also a factor. Quadros probably hopes that an attitude of "independence" in world affairs will win good will from leftist circles that are likely to protest the severe economic measures implied in his description of Brazil's financial situation as "terrible."

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